Economics

We will analyze the methodological issues, experimental data, reference theoretical models and their possible extensions based on experimental results, of economic problems involving individual choices (lectures 1-9) and strategic choices (lectures 10-24). We will focus primarily on the following 8 topics: - Lectures 1-3: Paradoxes in choices under uncertainty - Lectures 4-6: Elicitation of risk aversion - Lectures 7-9: Eliciting ambiguity aversion - Lectures 10-12: First-price auction markets - Lectures 13-15: Double auction and over-the-counter markets - Lectures 16-18: Public good dilemma - Lectures 19-21: Social dilemmas - Distributional preferences - Lectures 22-24: Social dilemmas - Belief-dependent preferences

Basic knowledge of Microeconomics and Statistics

We will focus primarily on the following 8 topics: - Lectures 1-3: Paradoxes in choices under uncertainty - Lectures 4-6: Elicitation of risk aversion - Lectures 7-9: Eliciting ambiguity aversion - Lectures 10-12: First-price auction markets - Lectures 13-15: Double auction and over-the-counter markets - Lectures 16-18: Public good dilemma - Lectures 19-21: Social dilemmas - Distributional preferences - Lectures 22-24: Social dilemmas - Belief-dependent preferences For each of the 8 topics, see the reference articles immediately below. Lectures 1-3: Paradoxes in choices under uncertainty • Abdellaoui, M., l’Haridon, O., Paraschiv, C. (2011), Experienced vs. described uncertainty: Do we need two prospect theory specifications?, Management Science 57, 1879-1895. • de Palma, A., Abdellaoui, M., Attanasi, G., Ben-Akiva, M., Fehr-Duda, H., Erev, I., Fok, D., Fox, C.R., Hertwig, R., Picard, N., Wakker, P.P. and J.L. Walker (2014), Beware of Black Swans, Marketing Letters, 25, 269-280. • Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E.U., and Erev, I. (2004), Decisions from experience and the effect of rare events in risky choice, Psychological Science 15, 534-539. • Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979), Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk, Econometrica, 47, 313-327. • Kahneman, D. (2003), A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality, American Psychologist, 58, 697-720. • Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1992), Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323. Lectures 4-6: Elicitation of risk aversion • Attanasi, G., Corazzini, L., Passarelli, F., and N. Georgantzis (2014), Risk Aversion, Over-Confidence and Private Information as Determinants of Majority Thresholds, Pacific Economic Review 19, 355-386. • Attanasi, G., Georgantz ́ıs, N., Rotondi, V. and D. Vigani (2018), Lottery- and Survey-based Risk Attitudes Linked Through a Multichoice Elicitation Task, Theory and Decision, 84, 341-372. • Bosch-Domenech, A. and J. Silvestre (1999), Does risk aversion or attraction depend on income? An experiment, Economics Letters, 65, 265-273. • Crosetto, P., and Filippin, A. (2013), The ‘bomb’ risk elicitation task, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 47, 31-65. • Eckel, C.C. and P. J. Grossman (2008), Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence, Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 1, 1061-1073. • Harrison, G. W., Johnson, E., McInnes, M.M. and E.E. Rutstrom (2005), Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: Comment, American Economic Review, 95, 897- 901. • Holt, C. A. and S. K. Laury (2002), Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, American Economic Review, 92, 1644-1655. • Holt, C. A. and S. K. Laury (2005), Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: New Data without Order Effects, American Economic Review, 95, 902-912. • Sabater-Grande, G. and N. Georgantzis (2002), Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games: An experimental test, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 48, 37-50. Lectures 7-9: Eliciting ambiguity aversion • Abdellaoui, M., Baillon, A., Placido, L. and P. Wakker (2011), The rich domain of uncertainty: Source functions and their experimental implementation, American Economic Review, 101, 695–723. • Attanasi, G., Gollier, C., Montesano, A., and N. Pace (2014), Eliciting Ambiguity Aversion in Unknown and in Compound Lotteries: A KMM Experimental Approach, Theory and Decision, 77, 485-530. • Attanasi, G., and A. Montesano (2012), The Price for Information about Probabilities and its Relation with Risk and Ambiguity, Theory and Decision, 73, 125-160. • Bleaney, M. and S. J. Humphrey (2006), An Experimental Test of Generalized Ambiguity Aversion using Lottery Pricing Tasks, Theory and Decision, 60, 257-282. • Chakravarty, S., and Roy, J. (2009), Recursive expected utility and the separation of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity: An experimental study, Theory and Decision, 66, 199-228. • Cohen, M., Tallon, J.M., and Vergnaud J.C. (2011), An experimental investigation of imprecision attitude and its relation with risk attitude and impatience, Theory and Decision, 71, 81-109. • Fox, C. R. and A. Tversky (1995), Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 585-603. • Fox, C. R. and M. Weber (2002), Ambiguity Aversion, Comparative Ignorance, and Decision Context, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 88, 476-498. • Halevy, Y. (2007), Ellsberg Revisited: an Experimental Study, Econometrica, 75, 503–536. Lectures 10-12: First-price auction markets • Cox, J., Smith, V., and J. Walker (1988), Theory and individual behavior of first- price auctions, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1, 61-99. • Cox, J., Smith, V., and J. Walker (1992), Theory and misbehavior in first-price auctions. Comment, American Economic Review 82, 1392-1412. • Goeree, J., Holt, C., and T. Palfrey (2002), Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions, Journal of Economic Theory 104, 247-272. • Kagel, J. (1995), Auctions: A survey of experimental research,. in Kagel, J., Roth, A. (Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton. • Kagel, J. and D. Levin (1993), Independent private value auctions: bidder behavior in first-, second- and third-price auctions with varying number of bidders, Economic Journal, 103, 868-879. • Ockenfels, A. and R. Selten (2005), Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions, Games and Economic Behavior 51, 155-170. • Walker, J., Cox, J., and Smith V. (1987), Bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid auctions: Use of computerized Nash competitors, Economics Letters, 23, 239-244. Lectures 13-15: Double auction and over-the-counter markets • Attanasi, G., Centorrino, S. and I. Moscati (2016), Over-the-counter Markets vs. Double Auctions: A Comparative Experimental Study, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 63, 22-35. • Attanasi, G., Centorrino, S. and E. Manzoni (2021). Zero-intelligence vs. Human Agents: An Experimental Analysis of the Efficiency of Double Auctions and Over-the-Counter Markets of Varying Sizes, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 23, 895-932. • Chamberlin, E. H. (1948), An Experimental Imperfect Market, Journal of Political Economy, 56, 95-108. • Gode, D. K. and S. Sunder (1993), Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero- Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality, Journal of Political Economy, 101, 119-137. • Gode, D. K. and S. Sunder (1997), What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 603–630. • Smith, V. L. (1962a), An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior, Journal of Political Economy, 70, 111-137. • Smith, V. L. (1962b), An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior (in Errata), Journal of Political Economy, 70, 322-323. Lectures 16-18: Public good dilemma • Andreoni, J. (1988), Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments, Journal of Public Economics, 37, 291-304. • Attanasi, G., My, K. B., Buso, M. and A. Stenger (2020). Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: The dark side of public financing. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 22, 769-820. • Brandts, J. and D. Cooper (2006), A Change Would Do You Good: An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations, American Economic Review, 96, 669-693. • Chaudhuri, A., Graziano, S. and P. Maitra (2006), Social Learning and Norms in an Experimental Public Goods Game with Inter-Generational Advice, Review of Economic Studies, 73, 357-380. • Cabrera, S., Fatas, E., Lacomba, T. and T. Neugebauer (2013), Splitting Leagues: Promotion and Demotion in Contribution-based Regrouping Experiments, Experimental Economics, 16, 426-441. • Croson, R., Fatas, E., Morales, A. J. and T. Neugebauer (2015), Excludability. A Laboratory Study on Forced Ranking in Team Production, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 114, 13-26. • Di Bartolomeo, G. and S. Papa (2016). Trust and reciprocity: extensions and robustness of triadic design. Experimental Economics, 19, 100-115. • Fatas, E., Neugebauer, T. and J. Perote (2006), Within team competition in the minimum effort game, Pacific Economic Review, 11, 247-266. • Issac, R. M. and J. Walker (1988a), Communication and Free Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, Economic Inquiry, 26, 585-608. • Issac, R. M. and J. Walker (1988b), Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, p. 179-99. • Isaac, R. M., McCue, K. F. and C. Plott (1985), Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment, Journal of Public Economics, 26, 51-74. • Isaac, R. M., Walker, J. M. and S. H. Thomas (1984), Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations, Public Choice, 43, 113-149. • Ledyard, J. (1995), Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in Kagel, J. and A. Roth (eds), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press. • Nalbantian, H. R. and A. Schotter (1997), Productivity under group incentives: an experimental study, American Economic Review, 87, 314–341. • Schotter, A. and K. Weigelt (1992), Behavioral consequences of corporate incentives and long-term bonuses: an experimental study, Management Science, 38, 1280–1298. Lectures 19-21: Social dilemmas - Distributional preferences • Bolton, G. E. and A. Ockenfels (2000), ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition, American Economic Review 90, 166-193. • Charness, G., and Rabin, M. (2002), Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817-869. • Ciccarone, G., Di Bartolomeo, G. and S. Papa (2020). The rationale of in-group favoritism: An experimental test of three explanations. Games and Economic Behavior, 124, 554-568. • Dufwenberg, M. and A. Muren (2006), Generosity, Anonymity, Gender, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 61, 42-49. • Falk, A., Fehr, E. and U. Fischbacher (2008), Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions matter, Games and Economic Behavior, 62, 287-303. • Fehr, E, Fischbacher, U. and M. Kosfeld (2005), Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences: Initial Evidence, American Economic Review, 95, 346-351. • Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt (1999), A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868. • Fischbacher, U. and S. G ̈achter (2010), Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods, American Economic Review 100, 541-556. Lectures 22-24: Social dilemmas - Belief-dependent preferences • Attanasi, G., Battigalli, P., and E. Manzoni (2016), Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game, Management Science, 62, 648-667. • Attanasi, G., Battigalli, P., Manzoni, E. and R. Nagel (2019). Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 167, 341-360. • Attanasi, G. and R. Nagel (2008), A Survey of Psychological Games: Theoretical Findings and Experimental Evidence, in A. Innocenti and P. Sbriglia (eds.), Games, Rationality and Behavior. Essays on Behavioral Game Theory and Experiments, Palgrave McMillan, Houndmills and New York, 204-232. • Battigalli, P. and M. Dufwenberg (2007), Guilt in Games, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 97, 170-176. • Battigalli, P., and M. Dufwenberg (2009), Dynamic Psychological Games, Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 1-35. • Charness, G. and M. Dufwenberg (2006), Promises and Partnership, Econometrica, 74, 1579-1601. • Di Bartolomeo, G., Dufwenberg, M., Papa, S. and F. Passarelli (2019). Promises, expectations & causation. Games and Economic Behavior, 113, 137-146. • Dufwenberg, M. (2006), Psychological Games, entry for The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd edition). • Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger (2004), A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior, 47, 268-298. • Elster, J. (1998), Emotions and Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 4774. • Geanakoplos, J., D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti (1989), Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality, Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 60-79. • Rabin, M. (1993), Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, American Economic Review, 83, 1281-1302.

The course consists of 48 hours (24 lectures of 2 hours each, on 8 different topics, with 3 lectures per topic). In each lecture: (a) we will introduce a specific economic problem and perform, with course students as participants, an experiment representing this problem in the CIMEO laboratory; (b) we will introduce a theoretical/behavioral model 'related' to the proposed experiment, and formulate behavioral hypotheses that the experiment just performed was intended to test; (c) we will analyze the experimental results with appropriate statistical techniques ('experimetrics') to check whether they verify the behavioral hypotheses. The analysis could lead to behavioral extensions of the proposed model, so as to account for systematic deviations from the predicted behavior based on the hypotheses formulated; (d) we will discuss the methodological and design issues of the experiment and possibly propose alternative implementations.

The interaction between the teacher and the students attending the course is a necessary condition for the implementation of the 4-step teaching method (a - d) mentioned above.

The final grade will consist of: - class participation (20%); - points earned in the classroom experiments (point (a) of the previous section) (30%); - a final project to be submitted a few weeks after the end of the course (50%). The final project will involve one of the following three options: (a) a report on 2 behavioral-economics articles of your choice from the course; (b) an analytical report on experimental data provided by the instructor; (c) a proposal for a new experiment aimed at answering research questions raised by course participants. The deadline for the final project will be agreed upon with the course participants.

Reference Articles: Lectures 1-3: Paradoxes in choices under uncertainty • Abdellaoui, M., l’Haridon, O., Paraschiv, C. (2011), Experienced vs. described uncertainty: Do we need two prospect theory specifications?, Management Science 57, 1879-1895. • de Palma, A., Abdellaoui, M., Attanasi, G., Ben-Akiva, M., Fehr-Duda, H., Erev, I., Fok, D., Fox, C.R., Hertwig, R., Picard, N., Wakker, P.P. and J.L. Walker (2014), Beware of Black Swans, Marketing Letters, 25, 269-280. • Hertwig, R., Barron, G., Weber, E.U., and Erev, I. (2004), Decisions from experience and the effect of rare events in risky choice, Psychological Science 15, 534-539. • Kahneman, D., and Tversky, A. (1979), Prospect theory: An analysis of decisions under risk, Econometrica, 47, 313-327. • Kahneman, D. (2003), A perspective on judgment and choice: Mapping bounded rationality, American Psychologist, 58, 697-720. • Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D. (1992), Advances in prospect theory: Cumulative representation of uncertainty, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 5, 297-323. Lectures 4-6: Elicitation of risk aversion • Attanasi, G., Corazzini, L., Passarelli, F., and N. Georgantzis (2014), Risk Aversion, Over-Confidence and Private Information as Determinants of Majority Thresholds, Pacific Economic Review 19, 355-386. • Attanasi, G., Georgantzís, N., Rotondi, V. and D. Vigani (2018), Lottery- and Survey-based Risk Attitudes Linked Through a Multichoice Elicitation Task, Theory and Decision, 84, 341-372. • Bosch-Domenech, A. and J. Silvestre (1999), Does risk aversion or attraction depend on income? An experiment, Economics Letters, 65, 265-273. • Crosetto, P., and Filippin, A. (2013), The ‘bomb’ risk elicitation task, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 47, 31-65. • Eckel, C.C. and P. J. Grossman (2008), Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence, Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, 1, 1061-1073. • Harrison, G. W., Johnson, E., McInnes, M.M. and E.E. Rutstrom (2005), Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: Comment, American Economic Review, 95, 897-901. • Holt, C. A. and S. K. Laury (2002), Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects, American Economic Review, 92, 1644-1655. • Holt, C. A. and S. K. Laury (2005), Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects: New Data without Order Effects, American Economic Review, 95, 902-912. • Sabater-Grande, G. and N. Georgantzis (2002), Accounting for risk aversion in repeated prisoners’ dilemma games: An experimental test, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 48, 37-50. Lectures 7-9: Elicitation of ambiguity aversion • Abdellaoui, M., Baillon, A., Placido, L. and P. Wakker (2011), The rich domain of uncertainty: Source functions and their experimental implementation, American Economic Review, 101, 695–723. • Attanasi, G., Gollier, C., Montesano, A., and N. Pace (2014), Eliciting Ambiguity Aversion in Unknown and in Compound Lotteries: A KMM Experimental Approach, Theory and Decision, 77, 485-530. • Attanasi, G., and A. Montesano (2012), The Price for Information about Probabilities and its Relation with Risk and Ambiguity, Theory and Decision, 73, 125-160. • Bleaney, M. and S. J. Humphrey (2006), An Experimental Test of Generalized Ambiguity Aversion using Lottery Pricing Tasks, Theory and Decision, 60, 257–282. • Chakravarty, S., and Roy, J. (2009), Recursive expected utility and the separation of attitudes towards risk and ambiguity: An experimental study, Theory and Decision, 66, 199-228. • Cohen, M., Tallon, J.M., and Vergnaud J.C. (2011), An experimental investigation of imprecision attitude and its relation with risk attitude and impatience, Theory and Decision, 71, 81-109. • Fox, C. R. and A. Tversky (1995), Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 585-603. • Fox, C. R. and M. Weber (2002), Ambiguity Aversion, Comparative Ignorance, and Decision Context, Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 88, 476-498. • Halevy, Y. (2007), Ellsberg Revisited: an Experimental Study, Econometrica, 75, 503–536. Lectures 10-12: First-price auction markets • Cox, J., Smith, V., and J. Walker (1988), Theory and individual behavior of first-price auctions, Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1, 61-99. • Cox, J., Smith, V., and J. Walker (1992), Theory and misbehavior in first-price auctions. Comment, American Economic Review 82, 1392-1412. • Goeree, J., Holt, C., and T. Palfrey (2002), Quantal response equilibrium and overbidding in private-value auctions, Journal of Economic Theory 104, 247-272. • Kagel, J. (1995), Auctions: A survey of experimental research,. in Kagel, J., Roth, A. (Eds.), The Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, Princeton. • Kagel, J. and D. Levin (1993), Independent private value auctions: bidder behavior in first-, second- and third-price auctions with varying number of bidders, Economic Journal, 103, 868-879. • Ockenfels, A. and R. Selten (2005), Impulse balance equilibrium and feedback in first price auctions, Games and Economic Behavior 51, 155-170. • Walker, J., Cox, J., and Smith V. (1987), Bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid auctions: Use of computerized Nash competitors, Economics Letters, 23, 239-244. Lectures 13-15: Double auction and over-the-counter markets • Attanasi, G., Centorrino, S. and I. Moscati (2016), Over-the-counter Markets vs. Double Auctions: A Comparative Experimental Study, Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics, 63, 22-35. • Attanasi, G., Centorrino, S. and E. Manzoni (2021). Zero-intelligence vs. Human Agents: An Experimental Analysis of the Efficiency of Double Auctions and Over-the-Counter Markets of Varying Sizes, Journal of Public Economic Theory, 23, 895-932. • Chamberlin, E. H. (1948), An Experimental Imperfect Market, Journal of Political Economy, 56, 95-108. • Gode, D. K. and S. Sunder (1993), Allocative Efficiency of Markets with Zero-Intelligence Traders: Market as a Partial Substitute for Individual Rationality, Journal of Political Economy, 101, 119-137. • Gode, D. K. and S. Sunder (1997), What Makes Markets Allocationally Efficient?, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112, 603–630. • Smith, V. L. (1962a), An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior, Journal of Political Economy, 70, 111-137. • Smith, V. L. (1962b), An Experimental Study of Competitive Market Behavior (in Errata), Journal of Political Economy, 70, 322-323. Lectures 16-18: Public good dilemma • Andreoni, J. (1988), Why Free Ride? Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments, Journal of Public Economics, 37, 291-304. • Attanasi, G., My, K. B., Buso, M. and A. Stenger (2020). Private investment with social benefits under uncertainty: The dark side of public financing. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 22, 769-820. • Brandts, J. and D. Cooper (2006), A Change Would Do You Good: An Experimental Study on How to Overcome Coordination Failure in Organizations, American Economic Review, 96, 669-693. • Chaudhuri, A., Graziano, S. and P. Maitra (2006), Social Learning and Norms in an Experimental Public Goods Game with Inter-Generational Advice, Review of Economic Studies, 73, 357-380. • Cabrera, S., Fatas, E., Lacomba, T. and T. Neugebauer (2013), Splitting Leagues: Promotion and Demotion in Contribution-based Regrouping Experiments, Experimental Economics, 16, 426-441. • Croson, R., Fatas, E., Morales, A. J. and T. Neugebauer (2015), Excludability. A Laboratory Study on Forced Ranking in Team Production, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 114, 13-26. • Di Bartolomeo, G. and S. Papa (2016). Trust and reciprocity: extensions and robustness of triadic design. Experimental Economics, 19, 100-115. • Fatas, E., Neugebauer, T. and J. Perote (2006), Within team competition in the minimum effort game, Pacific Economic Review, 11, 247-266. • Issac, R. M. and J. Walker (1988a), Communication and Free Riding Behavior: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, Economic Inquiry, 26, 585-608. • Issac, R. M. and J. Walker (1988b), Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions Mechanism, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 103, p. 179-99. • Isaac, R. M., McCue, K. F. and C. Plott (1985), Public Goods Provision in an Experimental Environment, Journal of Public Economics, 26, 51-74. • Isaac, R. M., Walker, J. M. and S. H. Thomas (1984), Divergent Evidence on Free Riding: An Experimental Examination of Possible Explanations, Public Choice, 43, 113-149. • Ledyard, J. (1995), Public Goods: A Survey of Experimental Research, in Kagel, J. and A. Roth (eds), Handbook of Experimental Economics, Princeton: Princeton University Press. • Nalbantian, H. R. and A. Schotter (1997), Productivity under group incentives: an experimental study, American Economic Review, 87, 314–341. • Schotter, A. and K. Weigelt (1992), Behavioral consequences of corporate incentives and long-term bonuses: an experimental study, Management Science, 38, 1280–1298. Lectures 19-21: Social dilemmas - Distributional preferences • Bolton, G. E. and A. Ockenfels (2000), ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition, American Economic Review 90, 166-193. • Charness, G., and Rabin, M. (2002), Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 117, 817-869. • Ciccarone, G., Di Bartolomeo, G. and S. Papa (2020). The rationale of in-group favoritism: An experimental test of three explanations. Games and Economic Behavior, 124, 554-568. • Dufwenberg, M. and A. Muren (2006), Generosity, Anonymity, Gender, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 61, 42-49. • Falk, A., Fehr, E. and U. Fischbacher (2008), Testing Theories of Fairness - Intentions matter, Games and Economic Behavior, 62, 287-303. • Fehr, E, Fischbacher, U. and M. Kosfeld (2005), Neuroeconomic Foundations of Trust and Social Preferences: Initial Evidence, American Economic Review, 95, 346-351. • Fehr, E. and K. M. Schmidt (1999), A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 114, 817-868. • Fischbacher, U. and S. G ̈achter (2010), Social Preferences, Beliefs, and the Dynamics of Free Riding in Public Goods, American Economic Review 100, 541-556. Lectures 22-24: Social dilemmas - Belief-dependent preferences • Attanasi, G., Battigalli, P., and E. Manzoni (2016), Incomplete Information Models of Guilt Aversion in the Trust Game, Management Science, 62, 648-667. • Attanasi, G., Battigalli, P., Manzoni, E., & Nagel, R. (2025). Disclosure of belief–dependent preferences in a trust game. Economic Theory, 1-38. • Attanasi, G., Battigalli, P., Manzoni, E. and R. Nagel (2019). Belief-dependent preferences and reputation: Experimental analysis of a repeated trust game. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 167, 341-360. • Attanasi, G. and R. Nagel (2008), A Survey of Psychological Games: Theoretical Findings and Experimental Evidence, in A. Innocenti and P. Sbriglia (eds.), Games, Rationality and Behavior. Essays on Behavioral Game Theory and Experiments, Palgrave McMillan, Houndmills and New York, 204-232. • Battigalli, P. and M. Dufwenberg (2007), Guilt in Games, American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 97, 170-176. • Battigalli, P., and M. Dufwenberg (2009), Dynamic Psychological Games, Journal of Economic Theory, 144, 1-35. • Charness, G. and M. Dufwenberg (2006), Promises and Partnership, Econometrica, 74, 1579-1601. • Di Bartolomeo, G., Dufwenberg, M., Papa, S. and F. Passarelli (2019). Promises, expectations & causation. Games and Economic Behavior, 113, 137-146. • Dufwenberg, M. (2006), Psychological Games, entry for The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2nd edition). • Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger (2004), A Theory of Sequential Reciprocity, Games and Economic Behavior, 47, 268-298. • Elster, J. (1998), Emotions and Economic Theory, Journal of Economic Literature, 36, 4774. • Geanakoplos, J., D. Pearce and E. Stacchetti (1989), Psychological Games and Sequential Rationality, Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 60-79. • Rabin, M. (1993), Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, American Economic Review, 83, 1281-1302.

Face-to-face lectures